the wisdom of pursuing such avenues of research, the heritability of behaviour is once again a hot topic.
In the biological sciences this renewed interest comes from three main directions: genetics, which garners the lion's share of public attention for its success in identifying genes that are associated with increased probability for a given trait (a success that has accelerated dramatically in the past few years with the advent of genome wide association studies); neuroscience, a diverse field that draws variously on cognitive psychology, linguistics, brain imaging and evolutionary biology; and epigenetics, which is the concern of this article. Because of its focus on non-genetic sources of inherited traits, epigenetics should be of interest to scholars of a period that did not yet understand the genetic mechanism of inheritance.
Epigenetics can be defined as the study of heritable characteristics that have a molecular basis independent of DNA. According to the journal Nature, which ran a special section on the field in May 2007, ‗epigenetics is riding a wave of popularity.' 1 Noting that more than 2,500 articles had been published on the subject within the year, the editors of Nature observed that the media portrays epigenetics as ‗a revolutionary new science. there is more to heredity than genes; some hereditary variations are non-random in origin; some acquired information is inherited; evolutionary change can result from instruction as well as selection.
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These are disorienting claims, which seem to violate some of the central tenets of genetics and contradict much of what we have learned about Darwinian evolution.
They suggest that biological traits can be inherited from sources other than DNA, that natural selection does not arise solely from random mutation, that Lamarckism may have more validity than most of us dreamed, and that evolution at times may be directed toward specific goals. I will explain more of the fundamentals of this new research as I proceed, but first I want to suggest that the interdisciplinary study of the nineteenth century has something valuable to contribute to the public policy debate emerging around this ‗revolutionary new science'.
Public perceptions of science play a large role in the policy making process today. 4 Ethics committees and policy boards recognise that literature, film, and other media shape popular understandings of science and that cultural values are relevant to decisions about scientific policy. Unlike debates over whether culture shapes the findings of science, no one disputes that culture plays a role in matters of science policy. The groups that have the greatest influence on establishing science policy are interdisciplinary committees of researchers and scholars, who hold hearings, sponsor colloquia, and issue recommendations. The participants in this process are drawn from a wide cross-section of the scholarly and professional world: scientists, doctors, lawyers, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, and increasingly, theologians. A noticeable absence in these interdisciplinary gatherings, however, is anyone trained to interpret and comment on culture. Scholars of literature, history, art and art history, performance studies, film and theatre are largely missing from the policy making process. This imbalance represents both a problem and an opportunity for humanists. The problem, of course, is that our absence from the room skews the resulting image of culture. The opportunity is for literary and widened throughout much of the twentieth century as disciplinary specialisation became increasingly necessary to scientific research and the humanities developed their own regimes of disciplinary expertise. But nostalgia for a time when science and the humanities constituted one culture does not point the way to overcoming the divide. We cannot return to a previous cultural formation. The gulf between the two cultures is too wide, and no amount of clarity or force of style can heal a breach that is a consequence of some of the largest social and economic trends in the modern world. Until recently, there was little to be done about the situation, but in the last few decades, the relationship of disciplinary expertise to public life has begun to shift.
The chief change in this relationship is the emergence of an influential, semiautonomous zone of activity known as the policy arena. This zone occupies an intermediate position between the disciplinary specialist and the public sphere, mediating even as it formalises the process of speaking out about public issues. The people who gain a voice in this arena are sometimes referred to as policy experts, but the source of their expertise lies in disciplines outside the policy arena. For example, one may get a master's degree or do a post-Doc in health policy, but this credential generally complements rather than replaces the MD, JD, or PhD that constitutes the expert's primary qualification. At the higher levels of the policy world, the credential that matters, the ticket that earns one a seat at the table, is scholarly distinction in one's home discipline. The policy process is best described as a transdisciplinary activity since its work is done by ad hoc groups of experts from other disciplines, who come together to forge positions on specific problems.
Today, expertise plays its greatest role in public life through the intermediary of and religious environment will prove the stronger influence on the child's character.
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To complicate the mystery, the minister, after his wife's early death, conceals from everyone that one of the two children was adopted. For much of the novel, the reader is kept guessing about which young lady is the daughter of a murderer. One finds oneself weighing each mental and physical characteristic of the sisters against one's memory of the two mothers, the murderess and the minister's wife.
Let me relieve your suspense. If I don't reveal the sisters' names, I can safely disclose the outcome of this convoluted plot without ruining the novel for anyone who has not read it. The daughter of the murderess does indeed inherit the propensity for murder from her mother, but the daughter of the minister himself is into the same temptation stems from Collins's conviction that the power of maternal inheritance is greater than any influences that descend from the father, through either nature or nurture. This seems paradoxical until one realises that the murderess's daughter inherits both her mother's propensity for violence and her capacity for love, and that it is the latter that wins out in the end.
Collins reveals that the innocent daughter is struggling against an inherited tendency toward murder by a simple novelistic expedient, ready at hand from gothic In several places the narrator affirms his faith that ‗There are inherent emotional forces in humanity to which the inherited influences must submit' (LOC 217). These emotional forces do not come from the environment -the minister's careful nurture of his two daughters may have cultivated these positive qualities, but they are, the narrator insists, ‗inherent' rather than acquired. In particular, they seem to be inherent in womanhood. The narrator explains why he believes in this ‗inherent' force in a long passage dedicated to assessing the possible influences on the good sister's character. While admitting the dominant power of heredity and marking a lesser role for environment, the narrator postulates an independent ‗power for Good,' whose origin remains unexplained by either factor. The narrator proposes (comically enough) that the source of this power lies in the onset of puberty. When a girl becomes a woman, her feminine capacity for love protects her. In hindsight, we can identify this mysterious ‗power for Good' as a pure emanation of Collins's own cultural presuppositions about gender:
While, therefore, I resigned myself to recognize the existence of the hereditary maternal taint, I firmly believed in the counterbalancing influences for good which had been part of the girl's birthright. They had been derived, perhaps, from the better qualities in her father's nature; they had been certainly developed by the tender care, the religious vigilance, which had guarded the adopted child so lovingly in the Minister's household; and they had served their purpose until time brought with it the change, for which the tranquil domestic influences were not prepared. With the great, the vital transformation, which marks the ripening of the girl into the woman's maturity of thought and passion, a new power for Good, strong enough to resist the latent power for Evil, sprang into being, and sheltered [her] under the supremacy of Love. (LOC 216-17)
Woman's innate power to love seems to exist independent of nature or nurture. Postulating this innate quality in womanhood renders all the forgoing analysis of heredity incoherent. Gender assumptions trump everything Collins's knows about nineteenth-century scientific theories of inheritance. If the change brought by time, the great and vital transformation that marks the ripening of the girl into womanhood, is nothing other than puberty, then why did not the other sister find strength in a similar transformation? The answer appears to be simple: the other sister is just too bright. Collins emphasises again and again how much smarter the evil sister is than the good, and her cleverness, inherited from her mother, seems to prevent the ripening of a feminine power for good.
Two conclusions relevant to twenty-first-century science policy may be drawn from this discussion of inherited behaviour in Collins's The Legacy of Cain.
(1) Before genetics, the cultural understanding of inheritance made ample allowance for the kind of maternal influences on biological development that epigenetics stresses, and (2) Collins's cultural assumptions about gender overruled his take on the science of the day, wreaking havoc with his novel's theme.
II
In its very incoherence, Collins's novel has something to teach us about the cultural understandings of inheritance in late-nineteenth-century England. During the mid- To look for a Victorian anticipation of epigenetics, I would like to turn to an unlikely source, Francis Galton. Galton was committed to the principle that ‗Nature is far stronger than Nurture' in shaping character, 17 and he inadvertently put the quietus to Darwin's theory of pangenesis, which gave some room for the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Galton's experiments with blood transfusions from white rabbits to grey rabbits proved that the particles Darwin called gemmules could not pass from the blood into the germ line, as Darwin had appeared to suggest.
Nonetheless, at the end of the chapter titled ‗Nurture and Nature' in his 1883 work
Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development, Galton makes a surprising
concession: ‗Nurture acts before birth, during every stage of embryonic and preembryonic existence, causing the potential faculties at the time of birth to be in some degree the effect of nurture.' 18 This sentence blurs the boundaries between nature and nurture in fascinating ways. It grants a biological basis to the influences of the maternal environment, and it opens the door to the possibility that faculties can be inherited from the mother that were not present in the child's DNA. These are two of the central contentions of epigenetics, at least as formulated by Jablonka and Lamb, by the editors of the recent special section of Nature, and by the contributors to the influential anthology, Genes in Development. 19 The fact that the mother's cytoplasm makes an important contribution to the developing faculties of the embryo was established many decades ago, but epigenetics has given a new twist to this fact. Research on DNA methylation and RNA interference has suggested mechanisms by which heritable information other than DNA can be transmitted not only from cell to cell but from parent to child.
These mechanisms can be activated by environmental stress, and if the stressful conditions continue for long enough, these cellular states can become subject to natural selection. This is, in effect, an explanation of how environmental conditions affecting the parent can be passed on to the child. In opposition to Kass's approach, many humanists would argue that readers learn to think critically about the human condition by situating a literary text in its own historical moment and by attending to the differences as well as the continuities between that time and one's own. Others might suggest that examining the formal complexities of a work of art could potentially undercut the very lessons Dr. Kass seeks to derive from it. In short, most humanists would advocate an approach that was more critical because more alert to historical or formal complications.
To propose that historical or formal sophistication is needed to gauge the relationship of a literary work to political concerns is no news to readers of this journal. But I have a more concrete proposal. Policy makers care deeply about the relationship of science to larger cultural assumptions, and they care about public perceptions of science just as much. Social scientists continually take the temperature of public attitudes about science using statistical measures, but literary and historical study could shed a different kind of light on the question. I suggest that we offer literary study to the policy community as a critical, historical and comparative instrument for assessing the changing place of scientific concepts in society. If that resembles the kind of research many of us are already doing, then all the better. The next step is to move our critical discourse beyond the confines of the literary academy and into the public policy arena.
In the case of Collins, there are several specific conclusions that one might draw from juxtaposing his vision of the heritability of acquired characteristics with that proposed by advocates of epigenetics. Epigeneticists think that study of the nongenetic sources of human inheritance might have a number of desirable social consequences. To begin with, knowledge that one's genome is not the only source of developmental traits or heritable attributes might undermine genetic determinism, the widespread belief that one's character is written in one's genes. As the editors of the special supplement of Nature put it, the field may be ‗an antidote to the idea that we are hard-wired by our genes.' 21 Jablonka and Lamb hold out a similar hope. They argue that molecular studies will help discredit the idea that ‗there is a gene for adventurousness, heart disease, obesity, religiosity, homosexuality, shyness, stupidity, or any other aspect of mind or body.' 22 Additionally, they suggest that epigenetics will challenge the popular conception of evolutionary psychology, in which human behaviour is always referred back to adaptive evolution in the prehistoric past. Since ‗epigenetic variations are generated at a higher rate than genetic ones, especially in changed environmental conditions,' they believe that people are able to adapt to altered life circumstances on a far more rapid scale than traditional, gene-cantered evolutionary psychology would allow. 23 Finally, they maintain that epigenetic evidence that evolutionary variation may be directed rather than purely random does not entail believing in a purpose or teleology to evolution, nor does it give support to intelligent design.
Attractive as I find all of these conclusions, I do not think they follow Collins nor Galton were tempted to see the hand of an intelligent designer in adaptive evolution, many other people in the 1880s were eager to draw exactly that conclusion -as they are today.
Jablonka and Lamb explicitly reject an intelligent-design interpretation of their results, but scientists rarely have control over how their findings are interpreted. Literature, drama, the arts, media, popular culture, religious discourse and countless other forces play roles in shaping how such research is understood.
Although I am not so foolhardy as to believe that literary studies can guide the way in which our society dreams its scientific dreams or shudders at its technological nightmares, I do believe that we have a valuable perspective on such matters, which could be of benefit to public policy decisions.
find ourselves faced with a situation comparable to that Collins encountered in the 1880s, when evolutionary theory was unsettling many things Victorians held dear.
In the Victorian era, literary figures may not have been clear-sighted in every case, but at least they were confident that their words joined in dialogue with those of scientists such as Galton, Huxley and Weismann, whose vision, after all, was not always pellucid about the social consequences of evolution. Although the institutional framework that enables humanists to participate in science policy today is entirely different from that which prevailed more than a century ago, the opportunity exists once again. Those of us interested in how culture shapes understandings of science should consider how we will respond to this opportunity. 
